'Disrupt, Not Displace': Rising Powers and the Global Governance of Peacebuilding Guest Speaker Monalisa Adhikari - ISWS Seminar Series

Structural shifts in world politics marked by the decline of the West and the accompanying liberal world order and the rise of disparate groups of non-Western emerging powers has prompted fundamental changes in the norms and practices of global governance of peace and security. Within the wider global peace and security agenda, the peacebuilding project is particularly contested by non-Western rising powers given its focus on building institutions based upon market economics and democracy which necessitates infringing the sovereignty of conflict-affected states, a norm central to the foreign policies of rising power such as India and China. Additionally, there is also growing evidence that the direct and indirect engagement of rising powers in peace and political processes of conflict-affected states (CAS), that differ and even contradict the liberal peacebuilding projects. This has brought forth key questions about the impact of such increased rising power engagement in peace processes on the liberal peacebuilding agenda.

Much of the extant scholarship has examined the impact of increased rising powers engagement in peacebuilding by examining: i) either their differences with that of liberal peacebuilders, or ii) the incentives they bring to CAS, largely overlooking the interests, agency, and the needs of conflict-affected states. Empirically focused on Indian and Chinese engagements in two peace process in South Asia, Myanmar and Nepal, in this talk, I aim to nuance the focus by highlighting how the impact of rising power engagement for liberal peacebuilding is mediated by the ‘strategic interaction' between the needs and interests of CAS in delivering on their peace processes, and what rising powers can offer.

I will argue that there are fundamental differences and gaps between what rising powers can offer, and the normative priorities, interests and institutional needs central to the peace processes of CAS. Such differences imply that rising powers can disrupt but do not displace liberal peacebuilding agenda in CAS. Material incentives brought by rising powers in the form of trade, investment, and defense partnerships allow for CAS to enhance their bargaining vis-à-vis liberal peacebuilders and disrupt the impact of peacebuilding projects on peace processes. However, normative priorities for inclusion, transitional justice, and rule of law of CAS differ from the ideal of ‘developmental peace' upheld by rising powers, ensuring that they cannot meaningfully contribute to the implementation of these normative priorities.