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DTSTART:19701025T020000
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DTSTAMP:20260925T024832Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210316T111500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210316T123000
TZID:Europe/London
SUMMARY:Attack and Interception in Networks
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Professor Francis Bloch, Université Paris 1 and the Paris School of Economics  Abstract: This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. It involves a mixed strategy of the attacker except when one target has a very high value relative to others. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We also show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker - a comparative statics effect which is reminiscent of Braess’s paradox in transportation economics. Finally, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibria of two variants of the model: one where nodes make sequential protection decisions upon observing the arrival of a suspicious object, and one where all nodes cooperate in defense. https://events.st-andrews.ac.uk/events/attack-and-interception-in-networks/
LOCATION:Online
URL:https://events.st-andrews.ac.uk/events/attack-and-interception-in-networks/
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