Past event
Department of Economics Seminar with Professor Gyöngyi Lórřnth, University of Vienna Financing and Resolving Banking Groups
Professor Lórřnth's research interests focus on financial intermediation, corporate finance and corporate governance. Her research has been published in leading academic journals such as the Review of Financial Studies, Review of Finance, Management Science and Journal of Financial Intermediation among others.
Abstract: We study how bank resolution regimes affect banking groups' investments in loan-making units with different financial strength. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution preserves groups' structure, which permits efficient reinvestment in weaker units hit by negative shocks but can prevent optimal investment ex ante. Multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution separately resolves weaker units following negative shocks and prevents reinvestment but can foster ex ante investment. The relative efficiency of SPOE and MPOE resolution depends on banking groups' risk profiles and overall profitability. The coexistence of both resolution regimes increases economy wide efficiency relative to the adoption of a uniform resolution regime for all banks.